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ALTERNATIVE TIME PATTERNS OF DECISIONS 
AND DYNAMIC STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS
Pierre Cahuc - Hubert Kempf 
Université Paris -1 Panthéon - Sorbonne
ABSTRACT
This paper offers a simple approach to study steady-state Markov Perfect 
Equilibria arising in dynamic games when players (are obliged to) commit their 
actions to several periods : it highlights the importance of spillovers and dynamic 
strategic interactions when assessing the various time patterns conceivable in 
such games. The obtained results are then applied to various, either micro- or 






















































































































































































In this paper we offer simple rules to assess time patterns of decisions in 
dynamic games, when players play Markov strategies, and we show how these 
rules can easily be applied to a wide variety of issues, from space exploration to 
trade wars in aircraft industries and to international monetary games.
The issue of the time pattern of decisions has been recurrent in 
macroeconomics since the now classic papers by Fisher (1977) and Taylor 
(1980), which claimed that, due to the staggering of multiperiodic wage contracts, 
feedback money supply is not neutral. But even though this assumption has 
proven very useful for modelling nominal rigidities and addressing many 
questions, it suffered from a lack of proper microeconomic foundations.
More recently, Maskin and Tirole in a series of papers (1988a, 1988b, 
1987) addressed the same topic from a totally different point of view. Their 
perspective was microeconomic and more precisely, rooted in duopoly theory. 
Their objective in this series of papers was to explain how oligopolistic firms 
behave over time, assuming that each firm is committed to a particular action in 
the short run. In other words, as in Taylor (1980), one agent (here a firm in a 
duopoly) decides an action valid for several periods and cannot alter her decision 
during that span of time. In the case of non-synchronised decisions by the firms, 
the game becomes an infinite-horizon sequential game : a firm when it makes its 
decision has to take into account the delayed reaction of its competitor, then its 
own future answer to this answer and so, recurrently until infinity. In order to 
study the outcome of this type of game, Maskin and Tirole restricted their 
attention to Markov strategies and then studied the perfect equilibria 
corresponding to these strategies, which they called Perfect Markov Strategies 
(MPE)l.
One player is said to have a Markov strategy at time t when she only takes 
into account actions by other players affecting her instantaneous payoff. As 
Maskin and Tirole (1988a) point out, the most obvious appeal of Markov 
strategies is their simplicity. In particular, even though they are without doubt ad 
hoc, they seem to accord better with the customary conception of what is a 
reaction in a relationship than the notion of reaction-through-threats developed in 
the repeated game tradition. Moreover, this last theory suffers from a multiplicity 
of solutions, and the use of Markov strategies appears as a nice way to overcome 
this difficulty, since it can be shown that they lead, under some conditions, to a 
unique perfect equilibrium.




























































































But even though this concept is trully remarkable, its use in economic 
problems has proved to be rather awkward, because of the complexity of the 
necessary algebra. Furthermore, no systematic comparison between several MPE 
corresponding to several alternative time patterns of a given game with 
commitment, has been offered yet.
The aim of this paper is then twofold.
Firstly, we want to show that, in restricting attention to steady-states, MPE 
can easily be studied and characterised, without having to explicitly compute the 
solution of the game. The setting we consider is similar to the Maskin-Tirole 
setting. We consider games with two identical players, taking place in discrete 
time with an infinite horizon. Each player commits her action to two periods. 
Therefore, two time patterns emerge for such a game : the game may be 
synchronised (both players playing in the same period every two periods), or 
staggered (one player playing in odd periods, the other in even periods). Given 
this set of assumptions, considering a given unspecified game (that is, a game 
relying on an unspecified payoff function), we are able to compare the actions 
taken in both patterns and their relative efficiency. Strikingly, these comparisons 
will be shown to depend on characteristics of the instantaneous payoff function. 
Two features are crucial:
i - the nature of spillover effects between both players;
ii - the nature of strategic interactions (that is, strategic substitutability 
versus strategic complementarity) between both players.
Remarkably, these two features are those already highlighted by Cooper 
and John in their study of static, non-cooperative games. In this perspective, our 
analysis appears as the extension to dynamic games of their own analysis of static 
games. With two major differences. Firstly, whereas Cooper and John were 
mostly interested in multiple equilibria arising in static games (what they called 
"coordination failures"), we restrict our attention to cases where there exists a 
unique MPE. Secondly, contrarily to Cooper and John who consider games with 
an indeterminate number of agents, we focus on games with a small number of 
agents, that is, on games where each agent has a non-negligible weight on the 
outcome of the game.
Building upon these results, we then address the issue of endogenizing 
timing, already studied by Maskin and Tirole, and obtain a simple result : players 
will always choose to alternate decisions (stagger) when there exists strategic 
complementarity. The link between strategic complementarity and time pattern 




























































































who reached the opposite conclusion. This makes it clear that it is of crucial 
importance to be very precise about the type of game that is played and the nature 
of dynamic links between players.
Secondly, we want to use these general results to study various (highly 
stylized!) economic scenarios with spillovers and strategic interactions and show 
how they very easily allow us to understand the dynamic behaviour of players in 
these settings.
The plan of this paper, therefore, is as follows. Section II is devoted to the 
analysis of the conceivable time patterns in games with two-periods commitments 
and presents our theoretical propositions. We then offer in Section III several 
examples allowing us to apply these propositions. These examples are either 
micro- or macro-onented. Henceforth, it should be clear that the potential of MPE 
as an economic tool is not confined to microeconomics but is also relevant for 
macroeconomics. We summarise our results and suggest possible extensions in 
section IV.
II - Perfect Markov equilibria and dynamic strategic interactions
We consider a game with two identical players. Each player i (i = 1,2) 
chooses actions a' from a bounded action space A. Players act in discrete time, 
and the horizon is infinite. Periods are indexed by t (t = 0,1,...). At time t, player 
i's instantaneous payoff v’ is a function of the current actions of the two players :
v| =v(a;,a,-') (1)
v(.) is a quadratic and concave function.
Players discount time with the same discount factor 8e]0,l[. Player i's 
intertemporal payoff can then be written :
v, = X S tv(< ,A « )
1=0
We make two assumptions about strategies :
1 - The two players are committed to their actions for two periods. 
Henceforth, two types of time patterns emerge : players can act either 
simultaneously or sequentially. If they act simultaneously, the game is 




























































































2 - The strategy of a given player (1 or 2) is very simple : she only reacts to 
the current action of the other player. Hence, following Maskin and Tirole 
(1988a), we shall look for the subgame perfect equilibria whose strategies depend 
only on the "payoff relevant" history. More precisely, this means that strategies of 
player / can specify an action at time t only as a function of the actions of player j 
that are arguments of her instantaneous payoff function at date t. Such strategies 
are called "Markov strategies". They have the advantage to limit the strategy 
space of the players, and allow us to eliminate complicated strategies that would 
yield too many equilibria in a dynamic setting. A pair of "Markov strategies" that 
is subgame perfect is called a "Markov perfect equilibrium".
The aim of this section is then to compare the two stationary equilibria of 
the two patterns of the game, given these two assumptions.
a) The synchronised game
If the two players act simultaneously, the optimal Markov strategy of 
player i is defined by the following program :
where v,(a',<r') is the partial derivative with respect to the j-th argument, j = 1,2 , 
and the second-order condition is :
Equation (2) implicitly defines the reaction function a' =a(a ') of player i. We 
shall restrict our analysis to globally stable Markov perfect equilibria such that
Max v(a‘,a ') + 8v(a',a ')
The first order condition implies :
v^a'.a"1) = 0 (2)
v,i <0 (3)
The implicit function theorem implies that :






























































































If eqs.(2) and (4) are fulfilled, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium 
such th a t:
an d :
a' =a(a 1)=a , i = 1,2
v,(a,a) = 0. (5)
We immediately notice, from eq.(5) that the synchronised game yields the same 
outcome as the static game.
It is illuminating at this stage to introduce the following definitions, 
borrowed from Cooper-John (1988):
(i) if v2(a;,a,")>0, the game exhibits positive spillovers;
(ii) if v2(a‘,,a;')<0, the game exhibits negative spillovers;
(iii) if v12 >0, the game exhibits strategic complementarity;
(iv) if v12 <o, the game exhibits strategic substitutability.
Definitions (i) and (ii) are straightforward. According to (iii), there is "strategic 
complementarity" when an increase in the action of -i increases the marginal 
return of i's action, and reinforces the effect of i's action, (iv) has the opposite 
meaning.
b) The staggered game
In the staggered game, let's say that Player 1 acts in odd periods 
(t=l,3,5,...) and Player 2 acts in even periods (t=0,2,4,...). According to Maskin 
and Tirole (1988a), we define two value functions for each player. Given a pair of 
Markov strategies (/?‘(«2),i?2(a')), let V'{a~'), i= 1,2, be the present discounted
payoff to player i given that last period player -/ played a-' and that henceforth 
both players act optimally, according to their Markov strategies, and let W(a‘) be 
the present discounted payoff to player ;, given that last period player i played af 





























































































(i?'(a2),i?2(a')) is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium if and only if there exist 
value functions {{v',W'),(v2,W*)} such that for any actions {a',a2) e A2 :
V‘(a~,) = Max {v(a',a ,) + 8fr,(a')} (6)
R‘ (a~‘ ) e arg Max\y(a‘,a"' ) + 8W* (a1 )}a (7)
W* [a‘ ) = v(a’, R-‘ (a‘ )) + 8V'(r ~‘ (a' )) (8)
We are looking for linear solutions, i.e. for linear dynamic reaction 
functions R‘:a~' t-> a' +p‘a~\ a! e9t. Moreover, we shall focus on stable Markov 
Perfect Equilibria, such that P' e]-l,l[. From eq.(7), R‘{a~‘) is defined by the 
following first-order condition :
v1(/^(a-'),a'<) + 8 r  (/?(«-')) = 0 (9)
and the second-order condition :
v„ +81f , (^'(a"'))<0 (10)
Before comparing outcomes of the staggered and synchronised games, we 
shall first state the following lemma giving conditions for existence and unicity 
for a stable MPE.
Lemma:
There exists a unique stable Markov Perfect Equilibrium to the game 
defined by eqs (6)-(8) i f  and only i f  the polynomial P(p)
P(P) = p482v12 +P35(1+5)v22 +2P28v12 +p(l+8)v„ +v12 (11)
has only one real root in the interval ]—l, l[ and |v11|>|Sv22|.




























































































We shall assume, henceforth, that the condition defined in the previous 
lemma is fulfilled. Then we are able to state the following proposition :
Proposition 1 :
The action taken in the staggered game â is bigger than the action taken 
in the synchronised game â i f  the game exhibits positive spillovers for  
a = â  (v2(â ,â)>0) and strategic complementarity (vn > 0), or negative 
spillovers fo r  a = â  (v2 (â,â)  < 0) and strategic substitutability (vl2 < 0).
The action taken in the staggered game â is smaller than the action taken 
in the synchronised game â i f  the game exhibits positive spillovers for  
a = â  (v2 (â ,â)>0) and strategic substitutability (vn <0), or negative 
spillovers for a = â  (v2 (â,â) < 0) and strategic complementarity (vu > 0).
Proof :
See Appendix 2
Proposition 1 allows us to compare the magnitudes of action between the 
types of game. The two players clearly behave differently according to the time 
pattern of their interactions. Since each player has a non-negligible relative 
weight on the outcome of the game, in the staggered game, at the time one player 
acts, she has her hands tied-off, contrarily to the other player : she is a temporary 
leader. Henceforth, she has to care about the whole dynamic chain of future 
reactions to her decisions. In the synchronised game, as both players act 
simultaneously, this does not happen : there is no dynamic interaction.
Proposition 1 shows that both the type of spillovers and the nature of 
strategic interactions matter when comparing the synchronised and staggered 
outcomes. That makes sense. Consider player i when she has to make a decision 
when (for example) the game exhibits strategic complementarity and negative 
spillovers at (a,a). Player i knows that, if she increases (decreases) her action, 
relative to the synchronised decision, player -/ too will increase (decrease) her 
action next period, due to strategic complementarity, etc..., which has a negative 
(positive) discounted effect on her present payoff, because of the negative 
spillovers. Therefore, she decides to decrease her action. This reasoning goes on 




























































































We are then induced to look at the welfare implications of the two types of 
game. This is the purpose of the following proposition.
Proposition 2 :
Both players get higher (lower) payoffs when they act sequentially than 
when they act simultaneously if, and only i f  the game exhibits strategic 
complementarity (strategic substitutability).
Proof :
Let a' denote the symmetric cooperative equilibrium value of a. a is the solution 
of the following program :
Max v(a,a)
Therefore, the first-order condition of this program implies th a t:
v,(a‘,a‘) = -v2(a‘.a') (12)
The solution a’ and its corresponding payoff will be used as benchmarks for the 
welfare comparisons of a  and a . a ,a  and a' are defined by eqs. (5), (A8)-(A9), and 
(12) respectively. Using the a method for comparing a,a  and a' similar to the one 
used in Appendix 2 to prove Proposition 1, entails :
•  a < a < a ‘ or a ' < a < a
if the game exhibits strategic complementarity;
• a>a>a' or a<a<a'
if the game exhibits strategic substitutability.
The two conditions show that a (resp. a) takes an intermediate value between a 
(resp. a)  and a' if there is strategic complementarity (resp. substitutability). The 
concavity of v(a,a) implies th a t;
•  v(a,a) >v(a,a)  if a < a < a ‘ or a ' < a < a




























































































• v(a,a) <v(a,a)  if a > a > a '  or a < a < a '
i.e. if the game exhibits strategic substitutability. QED.
Proposition 2 gives a strikingly simple rule to assess the superiority of one 
game compared to the other : it only depends on the type of strategic interactions 
between the two players.
Again, let us illustrate this remark by means of the case with both negative 
spillovers at (a,a) and strategic complementarity. The non-cooperative 
synchronised game results in a too high action by the players, compared to the 
cooperative outcome. As we have seen, the staggering of decisions allows players 
1 and 2 to decrease their actions, exploiting sequentially the existing strategic 
complementarity, therefore coming closer to the cooperative outcome : staggered 
decisions are Pareto-supenor to synchronised decisions in this case. More 
generally, in the presence of spillovers, whatever the time pattern is, the result of 
the non-cooperative game is inefficient. But the staggering of decisions, in the 
case of strategic complementarity, allows the players to dynamically exploit the 
strategic interactions between agents and to achieve an outcome closer, in terms 
of welfare, to the cooperative equilibrium.
Hence, from this proposition, we may consider the time pattern of such 
games as a device to accommodate the coordination failures generated by 
spillovers, indeed clearly an imperfect mechanism de facto to coordinate the 
decisions of both agents. We develop this idea as we now turn to the issue of 
endogeneity of the timing of decisions.
Let us consider the case when timing is endogenous. Let us say that, before 
the actual game starts, the players play a "timing game", in which they choose 
whether to act in odd or in even periods. This game allows us to obtain a very 
simple device for modelling decisions to stagger or synchronise. The choices are 
made simultaneously with pure strategies and prior to the first period. Moreover, 
in order to avoid the issue of the dynamics of the game during the adjustment to 
the stationary equilibrium in the initial periods, once the equilibrium of the timing 
game has been determined, we assume that the stationary equilibrium is reached 
at the first period. We could study the dynamics of the game and show, in the 
spirit of Maskin and Tirole (1988a), that our results hold if the discount factor is 
close enough to one, since, in such case, the stationary equilibrium is determinant. 





























































































Players synchronise (stagger) their actions i f  and only i f  the game exhibits 
strategic substitutability (complementarity).
Proof:







Proposition 3 implies that (even, even) and (odd, odd) are Nash equilibria if the 
game exhibits strategic substitutability and that (even,odd) and (odd, even) are 
Nash equilibria if the game exhibits strategic complementarity. QED.
We can now go further about the issue of the time structure of the game 
and analyse the consequences of the length of the period during which players 
cannot modify their actions when staggering is a non-cooperative equilibrium of 
the timing game. We can make the following proposition :
Proposition 4:
I f  players decide to stagger their actions, a decrease in the length o f the 
period during which players cannot modify their actions increases 





























































































Let us denote by T the length of the period in which the actions are fixed, and r 
the discount rate of the players. Hence the discount factor is given by b-e~rT. 
Differentiating eqs. (A8) and (A9) yields :
da - v 2(a,d)vlfi
&  (vn + p5v21)(vu + 8  W")
Proposition 3 has shown that players stagger their actions iff (3 is positive. 
Moreover, v„ + pSv21 < 0  (from eq.4), v,, +8W"<0 (from eq.10), v„ < 0  (from eq.3). 
Therefore, has the same sign as v2( d ,d ) .  Since v2(a ,d )  and v2(d,d)  have 
always the same sign (see Appendix 2), has the same sign as v2(a,a). From 
Proposition 2, we know that the symmetric cooperative equilibrium value, a*, is 
larger (resp. smaller) than a if v2( a , a ) > 0 ,  (resp. v2( a , a ) < 0 ) .  Thus an increase in 
5, corresponding to a decrease in T, brings a closer to a . QED.
Proposition 4 simply states that, in case of strategic complementarity, the 
more often (the quicker) agents play, the better off they are. Increasing the speed 
of the game when there is strategic complementarity, is a way to overcome the 
non-cooperative nature of the game. This is easy to understand. A decrease in the 
period length de facto amounts to an increase in the discount factor. Staggering 
decisions allows each agent to dynamically exploit the strategic complementarity 
effects so that she takes into account the existing spillover effects (see 
Proposition 1), and the individual welfare gain is higher the higher the discount 
factor is (the higher an agent cares about future): as agents play more often, they 
are able to rip off the dynamic gains of staggering more often.
It is then obvious that a decrease m the period length has no effect when 
agents choose to synchronise (i.e. when there is strategic substitutability) because 
there is no never-ending dynamic chain of actions to be taken into account in such 
a time pattern.
The main result of this theoretical section is that, in a two-player setting, 
the time pattern of the game matters and can easily be assessed. First, the 
discrepancy between the actions taken in the two time patterns consistent with a 
two-period game, depends both on the existence of spillovers and strategic 
interactions. As such, this result, obtained for dynamic games, is close in spirit to 
the Cooper-John analysis of static games with strategic interactions. Secondly, 
the superiority of one time pattern over the other only depends on the nature of 





























































































III - Some examples
In this section, we shall discuss five dynamic games with Markov 
strategies played by two agents. The first two games have been already studied 
by Maskin-Tirole and De Fraja and we shall show how our propositions very 
easily allow us to reach annd extend their conclusions.
a) Cournot duopoly competition
We shall first analyse the case studied by Maskin and Tirole (1987) in then- 
seminal paper on Cournot competition between two firms. Both firms compete 
through quantities on a given market. Each firm makes a decision (fixes a quantity 
to be sold on the market at each period) valid for two periods. They play 
sequentially. Both strategies are Markov strategies. The objective of a firm is to 
maximise the present discounted value of its future profits. At time t, firm i's 
instantaneous profit it' is a function of both firms's current quantities :
K'=n(q',q") i = 1,2 (13)
Maskin and Tirole assume that both demand function and production costs are 
linear, implying :
7i) < 0 jt'22=0 jrj j < 0 jt'12<0 / = 1,2 (14)
Hence, using the definitions given in the previous section, there are 
negative spillovers and strategic substitutability, as in standard Coumotian 
competition:
For any 8, there is a unique stable Markov perfect Equilibrium to the 
staggered game, given the linearity of the demand and cost functions (Maskin and 
Tirole's Proposition (1)) and we may immediately derive from the previous 
section the two main steady-state propositions made by Maskin and Tirole .
- the steady-state output is bigger when firms stagger their decisions than 
when they synchronise (from our Proposition 1; equivalent to Maskin and Tirole's 
eq.(23), 1987, p.955))
- both firms would be better-off if they chose to synchronise, when playing 





























































































Our Proposition 4 does not apply here since the current game relies on 
strategic substitutability. But Maskin and Tirole remark that, in this game, when 
period duration is arbitrarily close to zero, the steady state output will converge to 
the competitive output, concluding that "the relative timing of firm's moves 
matters crucially, even in the limit when firms react very quickly...[and that] the 
distinction between simultaneous and alternating moves remains important even 
when T is small", which also is the qualitative message of Proposition 4.
b) Union-wage setting games
De Fraja (1993) used Market Perfect Equilibria to compare the relative 
performances of synchronised and staggered union-bargained wages. In De 
Fraja's model, two firms compete a la Cournot on a good market, fixing the 
quantities every penod, and wages are set by two firm-specific unions. But the 
duration of the wage contract is two periods. We shall show that, thanks to 
Proposition 1-4, it is very easy to obtain the results highlighted by De Fraja, 
escaping the tedious algebraic computations of the explicit solutions he offers, 
following Maskin and Tirole (1987).
Let us summarize the crucial elements of De Fraja's model. De Fraja 
assumes that there are two trade unions (one in each firm), each one maximising 
the total amount of rent available for its workers. The labour demands are derived 
from profit maximisation, the market demand function is linear and there are 
constant returns to scale. Flence, the trade-union instantaneous objective is 
defined as :
U(w',r) = (w‘ -/•)■/' (15)
with : i  =l(w\w~‘) f=l,2
/1(h,','*'“')<0 ln{w',w~') = lu{w‘,w~') = l.n (w',w~’) = 0 (16)
w' is the wage paid by firm /, r is the reservation wage, and /' is firm i's 
employment. Then the instantaneous payoff function for union i can be written as
v(w‘,w ') = [w’ -r )- l {w \w  ') (17)
with :





























































































For any 8, conditions for stability and unicity of the solution to the 
staggered game are fulfilled (De Fraja's Proposition (2)) and applying 
Propositions 1 and 2 immediately shows that staggered wage setting entails 
higher wages and higher payoffs to the unions (De Fraja's Proposition 3), since 
there are both positive spillover effects (a higher wage for firm 2 means a 
relatively more competitive firm 1, therefore more employment in firm 1, and 
hence a higher total rent obtained by union 1) and positive strategic 
complementarities (a catch-up effect between unions). From Proposition 3, it is 
deduced that unions should stagger their decisions, even if it is bad for 
employment. Finally, Proposition 4 implies that a decrease in the length of (still 
biperiodic) wage contracts increases wages and unions's payoffs (De Fraja's 
Corollary 1).
Furthermore, we can extend De Fraja's results to include the aggregate 
side-effects of union-wage bargaining which are neglected by De Fraja. In De 
Fraja's framework, the pair of firms typically compete on a local market without 
aggregate side-effects : they are implicitly assumed to be very small. In particular, 
their behaviours have no impact on the aggregate price level. Now let us consider 
industries producing differentiated goods consumed by identical consumers with 
wage bargaining taking place at industry level. It is to be noticed that this is the 
case in many OECD countries like Austria, Belgium, France, Germany or the 
Netherlands. In such a setting, there exists another channel of interaction between 
firms, and hence between unions, through consumer demands and relative good 
prices. Does that modify De Fraja's conclusions?
In order to address this issue, we shall concentrate on inter-industry 
competition, instead of intra-industry competition. Let us consider a highly 
stylized economy. In this economy, there are two industries, producing two 
different goods, consumed by identical consumers. The preferences of the 
representative consumer are represented by the following utility function :
f/(C„C2) = C ? C ^ y j  a e]0,l[ (20)
where C, is the quantity of good /, i = 1,2, M is the quantity of money and P is 
the consumer price index, defined as :
P = (p ') i (p2)i (21)




























































































The consumer is endowed with a given money stock denoted by M' and 
profits are equally redistributed . Hence, the demand for good z is defined by :
Q‘ =
a M' 
1 -a  2F F
(22)
In each industry, there are competitive firms with unit constant return to 
scale. Hence the equilibrium price is :
F  =W
where W‘ is the nominal wage in industry z. A unique union is able to determine 
the nominal wage in effect in a given industry. In a static game, the objective of 
union i is to maximise the following objective function :
S‘= ~ { q ‘-n )1-U,w‘- p - w f  (23)
where n and w are exogenous employment and wage targets, and lower-case 
letters denote logs of corresponding variables. Trade-unions are compelled to fix 
a nominal wage for two periods. Using the definition of the equilibrium prices, 
the price index and the demand functions, union's i instantaneous payoff can be 
written as :
Hence :
I f f)-w‘ -fj)2 _ I |IV w~l
2 ' ' 2 u 2”









One can check that there exist a unique stable MPE in the staggered game, 
according to the lemma, if the discount factor 6 is larger than -j-. In this case, P(fi) 
is such that P(l)<0,P(-l)>0 and/5/(p)<0,p e[-l,l].
In brief, at the steady state, the dynamic game now exhibits negative 
spillovers and strategic complementarity. We are then able to apply our 




























































































i) The steady state level of wage is lower in a staggered setting than in a 
synchronised one;
ii) Staggering emerges as a non-cooperative equilibrium of the timing
game;
iii) A decrease in period duration decreases nominal wages and increase 
employment.
Results i) and iii) are opposed to the results obtained by De Fraja for the 
intra-industry competition case. In other words, both intra- and inter-industry 
competitions matter and have opposite effects on the relative importance of 
staggered nominal wages compared to synchronised ones, even though staggering 
is always best from the point of view of unions.
c) Input games
Input games have already been studied by Cooper and John in a static 
framework. Here we develop a dynamic version of this game, exhibiting dynamic 
strategic interactions. There are two identical players, each supplying one input to 
a joint production process. We note e' the "effort" level supplied by Player / (z'= 
1, 2). The resulting product derives from the following production function :
y = / ( e V )  = eV (27)
Notice that there are positive technical complementarities within the production 
process, i.e. : f n > 0.
The utility function of Player i depends both on y  and e‘ as follows :
U{y,e’) = ky -(e 'f  (28)
1 > £ > 0
It is assumed that Player i commits herself to two periods, i.e. chooses and plays 
e' for two periods.
Examples of input games abound. Let's think to all kinds of team or club 
activities or supply of public goods, e.g. : I
I - militancy of two political leaders, belonging to the same party, yet competitors 




























































































Balladur in contemporary France) : each leader has to decide on her level of 
political activity («'), the outcome for the party (ratings in polls, probabilities of 
success in elections,etc...) depending on both levels;
2 - joint pollution processes : along a lake there are two polluters ( countries like 
the US and Canada sharing the Great Lakes, cities or factories), e' is the level of 
pollution-control efforts made by player (polluter) i, whereas y  is the level of 
lake-water quality, depending on the efforts made by both polluters;
3 - a fiscal game within a political union: Two countries belong to a political 
union and have non cooperatively to decide on the level of their voluntary 
contribution (e‘) to the budget of the Union2, the result achieved by the Union, 
(y ), depending in a non-linear manner on these two contributions.
4 - space exploration : The US and the late USSR have embarked in huge, long- 
lasting programs of space exploration. Competition has manifested catch-up 
effects with temporary leadership for each country (Soviet sputnik, American 
Appollo, Soviet Mir orbital station, American Challenger Shuttle). Clearly, space 
knowledge is a public good, benefiting from both efforts.
Then the questions we ask are :
1 - Should party leaders synchronise or not their appearance on TV shows?
2 - Will polluters be more active cleaning the lake when they act sequentially 
rather than simultaneously, and should they act sequentially or not (one in winter, 
the other in summer)?
3 - Will the two countries channel more money to the Union when they decide on 
budget matters sequentially rather than simultaneously, and should they do so?
4 - Can we assess the efficiency of the space competition time pattern between 
the two super-powers?
From eqs. (27) - (28), the instantaneous payoff function of player z can be 
written as :
v(e',e ') = ke’e 1 -(e ’f (2 9 )
2 Some readers might argue that behaviours within a political union should be cooperative. Let's say that we 































































































whereas the spillover effect, v2, is equal to :
v2(e',e") = ke‘ v22=0 (31)
There is always a unique stable MPE in the staggered game since 
P(-l) > 0, P(l) <0, P(o) > 0 and there is one unique root between 0 and 1
Both effects are positive, and in particular, the game exhibits positive 
strategic complementarity. Therefore, we immediately conclude th a t:
- the action decided by each player is larger when they stagger than when 
they synchronise their decisions:
- and they should stagger their decisions.
For example, if we agree that space competition knowledge benefits from 
large technical complementarities (and can be formalized by the present game)3, 
we conclude that the Soviet-American space competition time pattern was the 
most efficient one, of course given the fact that both players could not behave 
cooperatively.
These statements directly derive from Propositions 1 -3 .
d) An international monetary game
Although monetary policy is rather flexible, especially compared to fiscal 
policy, governments are not able (or willing) at each period (as small as we wish) 
to switch the monetary policy course and alter their last period decision. Indeed, 
monetary economists distinguish "phases" or "episodes" of monetary policy, 
usually expanding over several terms, if not several years. Various factors may 
explain that monetary authorities do want to stick to a given policy stance over 
several periods : a desire to commit themselves and gain credibility, a desire to 
stabilize over-zealous, over-reacting financial markets, a relative inability to trace 
down the actual evolution of the economy, etc...In the meantime, in the 
international economy, the various monetary authorities usually do not cooperate, 
even though some act as followers relative to others. Moreover, they do not




























































































appear as acting "simultaneously", issuing "statements" or making decisions at the 
same time. Thus, the question arises to assess the impact of the time pattern of 
monetary decisions : is it efficient? Does it induce the non-cooperating players to 
over- or under-react?
We shall offer a first tentative answer to these questions by means of a 
highly stylized example which will allow us to consider and compare the perfect 
Markov equilibria of the game : we shall assume a two-country economy, where 
both monetary authorities commit themselves to two periods, and study the 
monetary game arising in this setting.
The two countries are interrelated in such a way that the output in one 
country depends both on the domestic and foreign money supplies. Hence 
spillovers exist between both countries. Canzoneri and Gray (1985) list four 
possible channels underlying these spillover effects : a Mundellian interest-rate 
channel, a goods demand channel, an indexation channel and an import price 
sluggishness channel. They stress the fact that the resulting spillovers may either 
be positive or negative^.
The two countries are identical. In order to make the application of the 
theoretical results more straightforward, we shall index the two countries 1 and 2, 
rather than talk about "domestic" and "foreign" countries. The reduced-form 
equations for outputs in the world economy are given by the following equations :
y  = 0yv + Am' + Bm - i = 1,2 (32)
where y' (y2) is (the rate of growth of) aggregate output of country 1 (2), m' (m2) 
is (the rate of growth of) money supply in country 1 (2), y N is the natural (rate of 
growth of) output. Aggregate output is a function of target output and both money 
supplies. As in Gibbons (1992), it is supposed that target ouput is less than 
natural output (0<1) because of the presence of monopoly power in goods 
markets.
We assume that monetary authorities perfectly control the domestic 
inflation rate (cf Dolado et al. (1994)), i.e. :
n' =m‘ (33)
A is always positive and B may either be positive or negative, but always smaller 
in absolute value to A.




























































































The instantaneous preferences of both governments or monetary authorities 
are assumed to be identical:
vi = - j [ ( y - / 0 2+n(*i)2] h>0 (34)
Governments dislike variations of actual output around natural output and 
inflation rates different from zero. Of course, these two goals are antagonistic, 
implying that governments face a policy trade-off: they could decrease the output 
gap at the expense of an increase in inflation rate above its desired zero level. 
Both governments are supposed to chose their money supply non-cooperatively.
From eqs. (32) - (34 ), the following instantaneous payoff function obtains :
v(m', m~') = - ^ ( (0 - l )y w + Am' + Bm~’)2 +ji(m’)2j (35)
The spillover effect is equal to :
v2(m‘ ,m~‘) = -S[(9- + Am' + Bm~'] (36)
whereas the strategic effect is equal to5 :
vi2 = ~BA (37)
When B is positive, the spillover effect happens to be negative and the model 
exhibits strategic substitutability. Since an increase in foreign money supply 
supports domestic output, domestic monetary authorities are induced to give more 
attention to their other goal, namely inflation fight, and henceforth, to decrease 
their own money supply. There is a unique stable MPE of the staggered game 
when 8 is smaller than (a 2 + p,)(4&4)~' since then, 
/ ’(l) < 0, P(-l) > 0, P(o)<0 andP'(p)<0, e ] - l , l [ .  Then we may state th a t:
(i) non-cooperative decisions are stronger when they are staggered than 
when they are synchronised;
(ii) governments, even though they do not cooperate, would be better off if 
they simultaneously made their decisions.
This is fair enough : due to the negative spillovers, both non-cooperative 
actions are too big compared to the cooperative efficient one. Since




























































































synchronisation allows the two players to decrease their money supply, this time 
pattern should be preferred by both monetary authorities.
But this result is reversed when B is negative, as in a beggar-thy neighbor 
world. Let us assume that this is the case :
B < 0 \B\<A
Then the model exhibits strategic complementarity between both countries 
: an increase in m ‘ decreases /  and induces player i (that is, monetary authorities 
in country /) to compensate this effect and to increase n i. There is a unique stable 
MPE to the staggered game when
(a 2 + p.)(-4ft4)"’ >8>(A(A + B) + n)(-B(A-B))~'since then P(l)<0, P (-1)>0, 
P{0) > 0 and P'(p) < 0, p e]-l,l[.
Then:
(i) staggered decisions are weaker than synchronised ones as both 
countries dynamically exploit the strategic complementarity link,
(ii) governments should then stagger their decisions, given the negative 
spillovers, since weaker decisions are to be preferred.
What can we deduce from these results?
Let us consider a plausible interdependence effect, through technical 
integration (corresponding to Canzoneri and Gray's goods demand channel), and 
assume that presently, the French and German economies are closely enough 
interrelated as to exhibit technical complementarities (through ventures yesterday 
like Airbus, now ventures in banking, insurance, broadcasting, telecoms, financial 
services) such that the B coefficient for both countries is positive. That induces us 
to conclude that they should strive to synchronise their monetary decisions (which 
they increasingly do)6. Of course, it is likely that such synchronisation is the first 
step to a closer monetary integration, leading to a common currency.
On the other hand, we may think that such a production integration has not 
taken place between UK and Germany, given the fact that the British economy 
has specialized in services, with a shrinking industrial sector, whereas Germany is 
still a major industrial power, or between the US and Germany, the two leading 
transatlantic monetary actors. These two couples are then supposedly 
characterized by a negative B coefficient (ceteris paribus). It is then no wonder




























































































that they do not try to synchronise their monetary process, and we may venture 
that UK is not ready to go along with a unique European currency.
e) A trade game
Let us then consider a trade policy game played by two governments 
through export subsidies. An important advance recently made in international 
trade theory is the integration of imperfect competition in international trade. A 
natural outcome has then been the study of trade policies, implemented by 
national governments in the context of imperfect international competition. 
Actually, "trade wars" (between Japan and the US on cars, between Europe and 
US on aircrafts,etc...) take place between a small number of players, within 
oligopolistic industries (typically with a national "champion", eg. Airbus and 
Boeing) and extend over months or years, through a lengthy retaliation process^. 
Policy measures typically last for several terms or even years and the issue of the 
tune pattern of a given trade war becomes of major importance. It is clear that 
interventions, statements by heads of national trade policy bureaus (eg. Clara Hill 
or Mickey Cantor for the US, Leon Brittan for Europe) are carefully prepared, if 
not planned and have lasting effects. However, the various studies devoted to the 
issue of trade policy games skip over that fact and usually consider one-period 
(possibly with several stages) games. Perfect Markov Equilibria allow us to go 
beyond that stage and assess the implications of the time pattern of trade wars8.
In order to do this, we shall extend the original classic Brander and 
Spencer (1985) framework of an export subsidy game, played by two 
governments and assume that each government chooses its level of export 
subsidy for two periods, due to decisional rigidities of various kinds (existence of 
implementation costs, desire to gain credibility through commitment, existence of 
two-periods plans for investment and production at the firm level, etc...)
Consider an industry, in which two firms, belonging to two different 
countries, produce a given good, sold only on a third market. At each period, the 
two firms compete on quantities, a la Cournot. Each government is able (and 
willing) to give subsidy to its national firm, in order to sustain its exports and 
hence gain market share on the third country's consumer market. Each 
government is able to act first, relative to its national firm. We assume that 
governments never subsidise on such levels that the firm would be unprofitable 
without the subsidy. As said by Brander and Spencer, "firms play Nash against all 
other players, and governments play Stackelberg against firms, and Nash against
7 For a recent survey on this issue, see Krishna and M. Thursby (1990).
8Tanaka (1994) is the exception, since he studies a dynamic Cournot duopoly with export subsidies, where each 
firm commits its offered quantity to two periods, and solves the MPE of this game. Our own example, however, 




























































































other governments" (Brander and Spencer (1985)). Notice that the scheme is 
actually similar to the de Fraja (1993) setting.
We index firms and governments by 1 and 2 (again rather than the standard 
"national" and "foreign"). Both firms are technologically identical. Each firm 
maximises its profit it', i=l,2 :
n '{q \q~ 'j) = qp{q‘ + q~')-c(q,) + s,q' i = 1,2 (39)
where q‘ is the production/export level of firm /', p{-) is the inverse demand 
function for the good, c( ) is the cost function, and s' is the per-unit subsidy given 
by government i. The inverse demand function is decreasing and linear :
pW W )  = d - W W )  d > o (40)
and there is a constant marginal co st:
A<t) = cq‘ D>c>0 (41)
Then immediately, the instantaneous output level chosen by firm / (i=l,2) 
is equal to :
=
D + s' - c - q
2
(42)
Hence q‘ is a function of s’ and s ' :
9' = (43)
with : A =D -c
3
9 i = | > 0  HI >1^1 (44)
These conditions guarantee the stability of the Nash equilibrium and are 
equivalent to the Brander and Spencer conditions (see Brander and Spencer 
(1985), p.87).
Each government, through its subsidy decision, wants to maximise the 




























































































payoff for government i, is defined as the profit of the domestic firms minus the 
cost of the subsidy :
v(s,,s") = Tt'(^,q''i,s,) - sV  =q’p{q' +q'i)-c{q') (45)
Notice that all strategic and spillover effects go through the indirect impact of s~' 
on q~', hence on p.  Substituting eqs.(40),(41) and (43) in eq.(45), we obtain a 
quadratic formula for the instantaneous payoff function :
v(s',s“') = A2 + (46)
The spillover effect, v’, is equal to :
v2(s‘,s-‘) = pq- +q‘ ■p '\q \ +q~,)-c-q\ =(p-c)q'2 +q' ■ p'-(q'2 +qf )
2£_
3 9 + 9
(47)
which is negative because of imperfect competition and eq.(44). That is what was 
expected. An increase in foreign subsidies augments the market share of the 
foreign firm and diminishes the domestic production and export and the market 
price. Hence, the profit made out by less sale for a given mark-up diminishes so 
as the gam made at a smaller price for a given production level decreases. 
Globally, the surplus is reduced.
The strategic interaction effect, v12, is equal to :
vi2 = ? ; ' = (48)
which is negative. This is common sense : remember that the net effect of the 
domestic subsidy on the instantaneous payoff is through price variation. As 
foreign government increases its export subsidy, increasing foreign production 
and proportionately decreasing the price level, the marginal net return of domestic 
subsidy decreases. Hence, domestic government is induced to reduce its own 
subsidy in order to regain a more profitable price level even though it means a 
further reduction in production and export. There is a unique stable solution to the 
dynamic game for any 5e]0,l[ since then, /J(l) < 0, P(o)<0, P(-l) > 0 and the 
two inflexion points correspond to positive





























































































Thus, we are able to make the following statement about hypothetical 
"trade wars":
(i) A trade war is more severe when it is played sequentially rather than 
simultaneously. That is, the level of export subsidies is higher when each player is 
a (temporary) leader, as it tries to use its temporary freedom to gain a larger 
market share at the expense of its competitor;
(ii) Everybody 10 would then be better off if a non-cooperative "trade war" 
were played simultaneously rather than sequentially. Indeed, as trade subsidies 
are individual responses to other's subsidies in order not to lose market share and 
are deteriorating joint welfare, synchronisation of decisions which would result in 
smaller export subsidies would benefit both competitors. This is well in 
accordance with the standard Brander and Spencer result that "joint welfare 
would rise if subsidy levels were reduced" (Proposition 5, Brander and Spencer 
(1985), p.95) and with the intuitive opinion about the worsening effects through 
escalation/retaliation measures of sequential episodes of trade wars.
IV - Conclusion
The basic qualitative result to be drawn from this paper is that spillovers 
and strategic interactions between agents are determinant for the study of various 
time patterns of mutiperiodic decisions. Restricting the analysis to a simple 
alternative between two time patterns (synchronisation versus staggering), we 
offered strikingly simple rules allowing us to make precise statements about these 
two tune patterns. In particular, we showed that the non-cooperative choice of a 
given time pattern is a way to reduce the inefficiencies arising from existing 
externalities when agents do not cooperate. In other words, such a choice appears 
as a non-cooperative mechanism to partially overcome the disadvantages of non­
cooperation.
We then offered several examples, either of a micro- or a macroeconomic 
nature, and applied the rules obtained for the abstract game. In real world, 
examples when actions are pre-committed to several periods, i.e. last, abound. It 
is clear that a presidential strategy, a space research programme, a trade policy, 
an advertising campaign (the list is not exhaustive), are carefully planned and 
extended over time. Hence, the issue of time patterns of decisions is not a trivial 
one. Our propositions allow us to make precise statements on the issue of timing 
in the various games we selected.
Our analysis has been restricted to a deterministic framework with identical 
players. It would be interesting to extend the analysis to a stochastic world. It is 
likely that the nature of shocks will affect the comparison between different time




























































































patterns, along with externalities and strategic interactions. The case with 
heterogeneous agents, with different payoff functions should also be considered, 
in order to prove the generality of the importance of strategic interactions in 
dynamic games with pre-commitments.
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Appendix 1
Differentiating eq.(9) implies :
dR'{a')
da' v11+s r ' ( t f V ) )
(Al)
The function W’(a‘ ) can be defined substituting eq.(6) in eq.(8):
W(al) = v(a', R-’ (a'))+5 v(r](r -(d )), R~' (a')) + 82W (r ‘(r -(a1))) (A2)
Then, assuming that R'.a"  i->  R‘{a :) = a' + p'a ' :
an d :
Wl (d) = vl (a1, R~‘ (a1))+v2 (a1, /?"' (a1)) • P~' + 5v, (t?( (/?"' (a1)), (a‘)) •





























































































r " ( al) = v„+2v12r , +(l+5)v22(p-,)2+5vn( r P ' ) 2 ,„ (A4)
+2Sv21(p-'P')2 +25v2,(p-)2p' +82r  ( / { ' ( / r V w r ) 2 
Eq.(A4) together with the linearity of R'{a~‘) implies that W' (a') = 0. Thus
// v
W (a') is a constant, denoted by W1 .
Substituting the value of W1 given by eq.(A4) into eq.(Al), with = P' yields
p'v11(l+8)+2p'p-8v12+(p-)2pf8(l+8)v22 +62v12(p')2(p-,)2+v1J=0 (A5)
The system defined by eq.(A5) has both symmetric and asymmetric solutions. 
Substracting the two equations defined by eq. (A5) yields :
(P'— P2)(v,, +p'p:8v22) = 0 (A6)
If v22 = 0, eq. (A6) implies : p1 = p2 = p




>1, the asymmetric equilibria are necessarily unstable since |p‘p2|> l and
can be ruled out. The symmetric solution can then be directly derived from eq. 
(A6) and we obtain :
p452 v,2 + p35(l + 8) v22 + 2P:8v12 + Pv„ (l + 8) + v12 = 0 (A7)
Appendix 2 - Proof o f Proposition 1.
At steady-state equilibrium, where a' =a~‘ =a, the definition of W(a) (given 




























































































/ .v v, (d,d)(l + P52) + v2(a,a)(l + 5)P
wia) =------------T W ------------
Substituting this expression for IV'(a) into the first-order condition (eq.(9)) gives :
v,(a,d) = -f58v2(d,a) (A8)
with :
P =v.. +6 W" 0-u[ (A9)
a and à are defined by eq.(5) and eqs.(8)-(A9) respectively.
The stability condition for the synchronised game (eq.(4)) implies that v,(a,a) is a 
linear decreasing function with a slope equal to vu+v,2<0. v2(a,a) is a linear 
fimction, with a slope equal to v12 + v22. v7(a,a) can be either increasing or 
decreasing.
Case 1 : We suppose v2 (a,a) is increasing, ie v2, +v22 >0.
In order to compare a and a, we have to distinguish two subcases :
Case 1.1 : Strategic complementarity : v12 >0
If v12 > 0, (5 > 0 and -fiSv2(a,a) is decreasing, with a slope —ps(v12 +v22)<0. The 
slope of v, (a,a) is larger, in absolute value than the slope of — fiSv2 (a,a) since :
vn +vi2 <-PS(v12 +v22) <=> v11+2v12+v22-(l-ps)(v12+v22)<0
which is always satisfied, since v(a,a) is concave, v,2+v22>0 and (58 e]0,l[. 
Thus, the values of a and a can easily be compared.
If v2(a,a)>0, then -(58v2(a,a)<0 and a>a (see figure 1)
If v2(a,a)<0, then — (15v2(a,a)>0 and a<a (see figure 2)
Case 1.2 : Strategic substitutability : v]2 <0




























































































If v2(a,a)>0, then -P5v2(a,a)>0 and a<a (see figure 3)
If v2(a,a)<0, then -p5v2(a ,a)< 0 and a>a (see figure 4)
Case 2 : We suppose v2(a,a) is decreasing, ie v21 +v22 <0.
Case 2.1 : Strategic complementarity : v12 >0
If v,2 >0, p>0 and -|3Sv2(a,a) is increasing, with a slope -f55(v12 +v22)>0.
If v2(a,a)<0, then -p§v2(a,a)>0 and a<a (see figure 3)
If v2(a,a)>0, then -p§v2(a,a)<0 and a>a (see figure 4)
Case 2.2 : Strategic substitutability : v,2 <0
If v12 < 0, p < 0 and -p5v, (a,a) is decreasing, with a slope ~p5(v12+v22)<0. The 
slope of v,(a,a) is larger, in absolute value than the slope of -P5v2(a,a) since :
vn +v,2 <-ps(v12+v22) «=> vn +p5v22-( l + ps)v12 <0
which is satisfied because the restriction of the lemma implies |v,, | > |8v221 > |pSv221 
and it is assumed that vn <0, P5 e]-l,l[. This implies tlia t:
If v2(a,a)<0, then -P8v2(a,a)<0 and a>a (see figure 1)
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